Following the 11 September 2001 attacks against New York and Washington, DC and the war in Afghanistan, 'failed states' have once again come to the fore of US policy planning. Previously, within a brief 'universal moment' (Holm, 2001, p. 361) in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the issue of 'state failure' was considered a responsibility of the international community. During this period, intervention to establish state structures was considered not only do-able but also morally responsible. Yet, beginning with the failure of US intervention in Somalia, this consensus disappeared and policymaking towards failed states became more ad hoc. Hence, as the significance of former anti-communist allies declined, a selective policy was adopted whereby those developing states that retained their strategic significance were still supported whilst the rest were left to their own devices. Additionally, states that refused to take cues from the US -such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq -became labelled as 'rogue' states and were engaged with accordingly. The stress was therefore put on the threat posed by 'rogue states' to the neglect of 'failed states', especially during the initial months of the George W. Bush administration (see Bleiker 2003; Caprioli and Trumbore 2003) .
This article seeks to address the recent shift in US policymaking interest from 'rogue states' back to 'failed' states. It is argued that the prevalence of notions of 'state failure' in US policy lexicon can be understood with reference to the persistence of Cold War discourse on statehood that revolves around the binary opposition of 'failed' versus 'successful' states. The purveyors of this discourse are within the academy as well as practitioners (governmental and non-governmental) who are all interested in issues that demand immediate attention, for example the implications of state collapse, building institutions in post-conflict societies or distributing aid. In addressing such issues, they focus on the supposed symptoms of 'state failure' (international terrorism) rather than the conditions that permit such 'failure' to occur. Instead, it is argued here that an understanding of 'state failure' should begin by moving away from the binary oppositions of Cold War discourse by focusing on the political economy of security relations. This is crucial in order to become aware of not only the different processes of state formation and modes of social organisation, but also the social and economic processes, through which some states come to 'fail' while others 'succeed'.
The difference an adjective makes?
Although these two labels ('failed' and 'rogue') are often used interchangeably in the daily political lexicon, the difference between the two has often been clear to US policymakers. One major difference is that whereas the notion of a 'failed' state refers to internal characteristics, 'rogue' states are labelled as such because of their (anti-Western) foreign policy outlook. Another crucial difference is that whereas 'failed states' are considered a cause for concern when they come closer to the brink of collapse (such as Somalia), 'rogue' states are viewed as directly threatening international order and stability (as with Iraq and North Korea). Indeed, during the 1990s, labelling certain states as 'rogue' and 'failed' served to enable different kinds of policy aimed at two different kinds of states: 'friends' and 'foes'. When 'friends' (or client states during the Cold War) posed a threat to international stability because of their 'weakness', the recommended policy was usually one of building 'strong' states, as was the case with Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia and Sierra Leone. When the 'failed' state happened to be a 'foe' it was invariably represented as a 'rogue' state and containment became the recommended policy course, as with North Korea. Consequently, in the immediate post-Cold War era, the eyes of the policy establishment remained fixed on the 'rogue' phenomenon to the neglect of that of 'failed' states, although the latter became increasingly recognised as a threat to international stability from the mid-1990s onwards (see Zartman, 1995) . Indeed, Brian Atwood, US Agency for International Development administrator, argued as early as 1994 that 'disintegrating societies and failed states with their civil conflicts and destabilising refugee flows have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability'.
1 This pathology became more acute after 11 September 2001 when the world awoke to the prospect of 'failed states' becoming a cause of concern even before they moved towards the brink of collapse. Hence the need for a better definition of what constitutes state 'failure'.
Since then, the example of Afghanistan, which served as a location for the alQa'eda network, has apparently shown that 'because failed states are hospitable to and harbour non-state actors -warlords and terrorists -understanding the dynamics of nation-state failure is central to the war against terrorism' (Rotberg, 2002, p. 85) . Recent studies on 'failed states' have sought to inform this shift in policymaking interest from 'rogue' to 'failed' states by focusing on the problem of inse-curity in the developing world and its repercussions for international stability (Chege, 2002; Cohen, 2002; McLean, 2002; Rotberg, 2002; Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002; Wanandi, 2002) .
2 This, in turn, serves to remind how the problems of the developing world customarily become visible to Western policymakers only when they threaten international stability. 'Failed' states are considered to be 'problems' only when the situation becomes acute enough to threaten the world beyond their boundaries.
The 11 September 2001 attacks have resulted in not only a change in policy discourse but also a shift in the US policy establishment's approach to state failure in that the need for prevention (understood as acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed) is emphasised as a means of coping with international terrorism and maintaining international stability (see Takeyh and Gvosdev, 2002; Zelikow, 2003, pp. 21-22) . As Robert Keohane (2002, p. 282, original emphasis) has added, 'future military actions in failed states, or attempts to bolster states that are in danger of failing, may be more likely to be described both as self-defence and as humanitarian or public-spirited'. The emphasis put on 'failed' states in the latest US National Security Strategy document can be seen as indicative of a move away from 'crisis management and containment' to 'early diagnosis and prevention' in its approach to the failed state phenomenon. The document states that 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones', and that, 'the events of September 11, 2001 , taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders '. 3 Yet, such a shift from an almost exclusive concern with 'rogue' to that of 'failed' states requires a better appreciation of the processes through which some states come to 'fail' whilst others 'succeed'. As Robert Rotberg (2002, p. 93) has argued, 'state failure is man-made, not merely accidental nor -fundamentally -caused geographically, environmentally, or externally. Leadership decisions and leadership failures have destroyed states and continue to weaken the fragile polities that operate on the cusp of failure'.
However, it would be misleading to represent local leaderships as solely responsible for state failure. After all, focusing on the domestic dynamics to the neglect of the socio-economic conjuncture, that allows some states to 'fail' and others to 'succeed', would not enable one to address the long-term consequences of state failure. Instead, an alternative approach that looks at the political economy of security relations between 'failed' states and their 'successful' counterparts is needed.
Rogue states and US policies
Although similar assumptions prevailed as a result of anterior developments, the 'rogue' label emerged predominantly in US foreign policy discourse in the postCold War era. Whilst inclusion within the 'rogues gallery' is rather arbitrary, three criteria have been commonly invoked: the pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruc-tion (WMD), the use of international terrorism as an instrument of state policy and a foreign policy orientation threatening US interests in key regions of the world (Litwak, 2000, p. 49) . These criteria became the cornerstone of the US post-Cold War containment doctrine to meet the perceived challenges of 'rogue states,' which often appeared in the annual US State Department's 'global terrorism' list. 4 An early declaration of this containment doctrine was articulated by Anthony Lake, then assistant for national security during the administration of President Bill Clinton, in a piece on 'confronting backlash states'. Lake maintained that recalcitrant and outlaw states were those that assaulted the basic values of 'the family of nations' (the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the promotion of collective security) and consisted of regimes 'on the wrong side of history': Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya (Lake, 1994, pp. 45-55) . Similarly, the then secretary of state Madeleine Albright announced that 'dealing with the rogue states is one of the greatest challenges of our time ... because they are there with the sole purpose of destroying the system'.
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Reflecting upon such policy declarations, it was maintained that, as the certainty of Cold War threat perceptions eroded in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, US security practice underwent a process of rethinking, as a result of which 'rogue states' were represented as the emerging primary threats during the postCold War period. This can be viewed as an attempt on the part of US policymakers and others to replace the threat of communist expansionism with another 'one size fits all' nemesis. 6 Although it is worth re-emphasising that 'rogue states' were not constructed ex nihilo, with such conceptions flourishing as a result of prior Cold War developments, the rogue state label was considered to reflect US policy preferences as the sole superpower of the post-Cold War era (Klare, 1995) .
The explicit 'rogue states' metaphor was notably dropped during the last year of office during the Clinton administration to become replaced by the more neutral 'states of concern' term. 7 Reflecting on this at the time, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright confessed that 'we are now calling these states "states of concern" because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, and their desire to disrupt the international system'. 8 Since then, invoking the spectre of devastating nuclear, chemical or biological attack from 'rogue states' has served as the rationale justifying an expansion of military forces, including the deployment of the National Missile Defence (NMD) system. As the recent Proliferation: Threat and Response report by the US Department of Defence evidences, the countering of rogue 'states of concern' has become a central tenet of the security strategy of the George W. Bush administration. 9 Indeed, 'rogue states' became the entire raison d'être of NMD and the cornerstone of policy planning. 'We believe', US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared in February 2001, 'that it is our responsibility to have a missile defence shield to protect the United States and our friends and allies from rogue states'. 10 'Unlike the Cold War', President George W. Bush told students at the US National Defence University, 'today's most urgent threat stems from ... a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life '. 11 This stress is also best exemplified by the Bush administration's aim of stopping 'regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction' that 'constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world'. 
From 'rogue' to 'failed' states
The recent interest in 'failed states' seemingly constitutes a departure from the simplifications of the 'rogue' state doctrine in that 'threats' to international stability posed by state failure per se are documented. Different from their 'rogue' counterparts, 'failed' states are considered to constitute a threat not because of their foreign policy stance, but because they have become places for terrorist networks to use as hideouts. Nick Stern (2001, p. 1) , senior vice president and chief economist of the World Bank, has declared in a recent interview that 'we have to understand the role of failed states that often provide or condone safe havens for organised terrorism'. The UK's prime minister Tony Blair has extended this logic in initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development (NePAD) when arguing that it is 'the failed states, the dictatorships, the economically and politically bankrupt' that export drugs, terror and extremism; hence the need for new development initiatives. 13 One of the most recent MoD reports in the UK, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, similarly signals the compulsion to address 'the breeding grounds of terrorism abroad' to prevent 'the growth of failed-state havens for terrorists'. It claims to be 'well placed to help less capable states build a society in which terrorism is less likely to emerge', through conflict prevention by undertaking peace support operations, by training other states' armed forces and transferring military skills 'so that they can do the job themselves'. 14 Yet, the phenomenon of state 'failure' defies generalisation. One brash rendering of the 'failed states' approach gauges degrees of 'stateness' along a continuum starting with those states that meet classical Weberian criteria of statehood and ending with those that meet none of these criteria of 'successful' statehood (Gros, 1996) . In common with attempts elsewhere (Carment, 2003) , the goal is to assess states in order to assist in 'calibrating' the conditions for successful intervention. As a result, a taxonomy of 'failed states' has been developed by Gros (1996) ranging from so-called 'anarchic states' (Somalia, Liberia), to 'phantom' or 'mirage states' (Zaïre/Democratic Republic of Congo), to 'anaemic states' (Haiti), to 'captured states' (Rwanda) or 'aborted states' (Angola, Mozambique). Paraphrasing Mark Duffield (2001, p. 13) , this view of conflict zones is akin to Victorian butterfly collectors constructing lists and typologies of the different species identified. The problem is that the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of such taxonomy is barely recognised. Yet precisely such arbitrariness characterises the diagnoses of state failure within Western foreign policymaking. This, in turn, has implications for practices of intervention (Duffield, 2002; Ottaway, 2002) .
Furthermore, as Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause (2002b, pp. 753-755) have argued, prevailing understandings of 'state failure' rest on assumptions about ' "stateness" against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed'. The point being that presenting the experience of developing states as 'deviations' from the norm does not only reinforce commonly held assumptions about 'ideal' statehood but also inhibits reflection on the binary opposition of 'failed' versus 'successful' states. This approach is symptomatic of the prevalence of Cold War discourses that revolve around such binary oppositions (e.g. Jackson, 1990) .
Although preventing state failure is presented as a primary concern in tackling the problem of insecurity in the developing world, this is still largely shaped by the persistence of Cold War discourses. As Jack Straw has admitted, in the ostensibly post-Cold War era, 'the East and West no longer needed to maintain extensive spheres of influence through financial and other forms of assistance to states whose support they wanted. So the bargain between the major powers and their client states unravelled'. 15 The result, in his view, is again the perfusion of warlords, criminals, drug barons or terrorists that fill the vacuum within failed states and hence, despite the controversy it may court, there is 'no doubt' that the domino theory applies to the 'chaos' of failed states. 16 Therefore, although the 'formal Cold War' has ceased -involving the stalemate between capitalism and communism -a 'structural Cold War' still prevails -involving new justifications for the persistence of old institutions that perpetuate mental frameworks in search of alternative applications (Cox with Schecter, 2002, p. 160 ). The post-11 September 2001 interest in state failure does not therefore constitute a deviation from, but a persistence of, Cold War thinking and policies suitably adjusted to 'new world order' power relations (Bilgin and Morton, 2002) . This is best exemplified by avatars of global capitalism, such as Larry Diamond, extolling the need to win the 'New Cold War on Terrorism' through the extension of a global governance imperative linked to the promotion of liberal democracy (Diamond, 2002) .
The need for a better appreciation of state 'failure'
A better appreciation of state failure is not likely to materialise unless the socioeconomic conjuncture within which such 'failure' emerges is analysed. However, little reference is commonly made to the processes through which these states have come to 'fail' whilst others 'succeeded'. In other words, the conditions that allow for state failure to occur are almost never investigated (Milliken and Krause, 2002a is a significant exception to this generalisation). Yet, this is an important avenue for research because existing approaches are rooted in the assumption that 'failures' are caused by the intrinsic characteristics of certain states without necessarily reflecting upon their colonial background and/or their peripheral position in global politico-economic structures. The broader point to make is that the ways in which deepening our understanding of the factors that have led some states to 'fail' may also help us to take alternative action.
A second problem is that the contributors to present debates reduce state 'success' or 'failure' to an empirically observable capacity to manipulate (usually) coercive resources resulting in a not-so-democratic overtone of control and subordination (see Migdal, 1988 and . Such insistence on the need for strong states to establish stability and political control is again not new but reminiscent of Cold War approaches to modernisation and development in the less-developed world when explanations were sought for the prevalence, particularly in Latin America, of authoritarian rule and 'strong' state corporatist regimes.
Third, the stance of many contributors to state 'failure' analysis is reminiscent of the liberal peace 'two worlds' approach that has characterised post-Cold War debates on international security. The 'two worlds' -labelled as 'core' and 'periphery' by James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul (1992) -are represented as the zone of conflict (periphery) and zone of peace (core). The practical implication of the 'two worlds' approach is that the structural and constitutive relationships between the two realms of security are obscured. The only alternative left to the 'failed' states of the world is presented as that of becoming 'strong' states and joining the liberal peace. Yet what is left underemphasised is the centrality, for instance, of arms exports to many Western economies, which effectively underlines the contradictions at work in the making of the 'zone of peace' and 'zone of conflict'. What sustains such relations within the arms trade industry, despite the critical voices raised by non-governmental organisations, is the representation of some states as 'failed' within 'zones of conflict'. Therefore, the inherently unequal structural relationships between the two zones are sustained.
Fourth, prevalent approaches to state failure and collapse, as 'deviance' from the norm, help to establish 'both a justification and legitimacy for intervention', thereby marginalising alternative approaches (and practices) (see Duffield, 2002 Duffield, , p. 1050 . After all, as Milliken and Krause (2002b, p. 762) remind us, 'what has collapsed is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive developmental state that sustained generations of academics, activists and policymakers, than any real existing state'. Hence the authors' call to analyse state failure (and collapse) as part of a 'broader and more prevalent crisis in the capacities and legitimacy of modern states' (Milliken and Krause, 2002b, p. 755 ).
The fifth problem that is neglected is recognition of the role played by the sequencing of aid and structural adjustment programmes by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank that have exacerbated the political and socio-economic landscape of states in the developing world. Further attention needs to be drawn to the institutional processes that have impacted on and constructed conditions of state failure (Ottaway, 2002) , which are often embedded within wider institutional practices throughout the global political economy that contribute to weakening state capacity. Recognition of globally embedded state failure within IMF structures and policies that have insisted on cutting back the state itself, effectively dismantling modes of authority, mechanisms of social regulation and the maintenance of social bonds within developing states, is therefore essential.
An alternative approach would therefore have to appreciate better the forces that shape the realms of political economy and security constraining and enabling developing states. Needless to say this is easier said than done. One way to do this, we argue, is to open analysis up to the different processes of state formation and the historical circumstances constitutive of various developing states. This might permit an appreciation of the differing historical and contemporary social circumstances and the alternative -but no less legitimate -modes of social organisation that prevail within states of the developing world. Linked to this is the need to shift the focus from pathologies of deviancy, or 'aberration and breakdown', to understanding the different strategies of accumulation, redistribution and political legitimacy that unfold in zones of conflict, thereby appreciating war as 'social transformation' (Duffield, 2001, pp. 136, 140; Duffield, 2002) . To cite Mark Duffield directly (2001, p. 6 
'there is a distinction between seeing conflict in terms of having causes that lead mechanically to forms of breakdown, as opposed to sites of innovation and reordering resulting in the creation of new types of legitimacy and authority'.
For example, factional struggles within and between states in sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia, Rwanda, Congo, Uganda), allied with the interests of IFIs can be interpreted as reducing war to a mode of production: a source of accumulation that enables the seizure of the resources of the economy alongside criminalisation and diplomatic, military or humanitarian aid to transform social institutions and political activity (Bayart, 1993, pp. xiii-xiv; see also Reno, 1998; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, 1999) . Hence a need to consider different forms and processes of state formation that have unfolded in diverse regions rather than obscuring the multiple historical and contemporary trajectories of state development.
This means appreciating that bodies such as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), set up on 1 April 2002 to establish a fourth Somali government in Baidoa, joining the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland in rejecting the authority of the Transitional National Government in Mogadishu, are less an example of state failure than a contestation over social and political organisation. Similarly the conflagration in the Ivory Coast, since 19 September 2002, initially involving the launch of an attack by army rebels on Abidjan and two northern towns, Bouaké and Korhogo, in an attempt to seize power, is less a recent fallen 'domino' in the spread of failed states than an example of the predatory pursuit of wealth and power -a struggle over modes of governance -that has to be related to the specific historical experiences and the cultural and political conditions of sub-Saharan Africa through which political power is disseminated and wealth redistributed (Morton, 2004) . This sort of approach might push one to reflect on suggestive historical precedents to struggles in developing countries over political authority and mechanisms of social organisation that may parallel earlier periods of state formation elsewhere in the modern world. It might also lead to a more detailed examination of what historical and contemporary social circumstances give rise to state break-ups and alternative modes of social organisation related to periods of social transformation and changes in capitalism; the role played by the coexistence of Western economic penetration and colonial domination; how overlapping structures of kinship might be prone to challenges which weaken specific social relationships; and what the impact of the changing nature of internal and international conflict might be within developing states.
Conclusion: the fallacy of short-termism
Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas 'something' needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of 'short-termism' in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating.
The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'.
Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167-170) , divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information.
Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories.
Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of 'failure' raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.
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